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1. Introduction 
Textbook analysis of trade policy games used to model ‘trade wars’ usually assumes 
symmetry so that both countries are identical or similar in size. Then, with both the terms of 
trade argument for a tariff and the profit-shifting argument for export subsidies, the trade 
policy game is a prisoners’ dilemma where both countries are worse off in the Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies than under free trade. However, with the terms of trade argument 
for a tariff, Johnson (1953-54) showed that one country could be better off in the Nash 
equilibrium in tariffs than under free trade if its elasticity of import demand is sufficiently 
larger than that of the other country. Kennan and Riezman (1988) and Syropoulos (2002) 
showed that it is the larger country that may win a trade war. With the profit-shifting 
argument for an export subsidy as in Brander and Spencer (1985), Collie (1993) has shown 
that a country may be better off in the Nash equilibrium in export subsidies than under free 
trade if its firm has sufficiently lower costs than the firm in the other country. Thus, when 
there are asymmetries between countries, one country may win a trade war. 
The Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly is 
different as both exporting countries will be better off in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes 
than under free trade in a symmetric trade policy game. This has been shown 
diagrammatically by Helpman and Krugman (1989, pp. 111-112) and algebraically, with 
linear demand functions and constant marginal costs, by Rivera-Batiz and Oliva (2003, 
pp. 270-271). An obvious question is whether one country may lose the ‘trade war’ in the 
Eaton and Grossman (1986) model when there are asymmetries between the countries in 
terms of demand or cost functions. This letter presents a simple proof to show that both 
countries will always be better off in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes than under free 
trade whatever the demand and cost asymmetries and whatever the functional form of the 
demand and cost functions. 
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2. The Model 
Two countries A and B each have one firm that competes in a Bertrand duopoly in a 
third-country market as in Eaton and Grossman (1986). The demand in the third-country 
market for the product of firm A is ( ),A A By p p  and for the product of firm B is ( ),B A By p p  
where Ap  is the price set by firm A and Bp  is the price set by firm B. Demand functions are 
decreasing in a firm’s own price, 0A A AAy y p≡ ∂ ∂ <  and 0BBy < , and increasing in the price 
of its competitor, 0A A BBy y p≡ ∂ ∂ >  and 0BAy > , so the products are substitutes. The own-
price effects on demand are assumed to dominate the cross-price effects so A AA By y>  and 
B B
B Ay y> . There is no consumption of the products of the two firms in the markets of 
countries A and B. The total costs of firm A are ( )A Ac y  with 0A A Ayc c y≡ ∂ ∂ >  and the total 
costs of firm B are ( )B Bc y  with 0B B Byc c y≡ ∂ ∂ > . The government in country A imposes an 
export tax Ae  and the government in country B imposes an export tax Be  per unit of exports. 
The profits of the two firms from exports to the third-country market are: 
 ( ) ( )A A A A A A A B B B B B B Bp y c y e y p y c y e yπ π= − − = − −  (1) 
Assuming an interior solution where both firms export to the third-country market, the 
first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium in prices (the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium) are: 
 
( )
( )
0
0
A
A A A A A A
A y AA
B
B B B B B B
B y BB
p c e y y
p
p c e y y
p
ππ
ππ
∂≡ = − − + =∂
∂≡ = − − + =∂
 (2) 
To obtain the comparative static results for the effects of the export taxes of the two 
countries on prices, totally differentiate the first order-conditions: 
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A A A AA
AA AB A
B B B BB
BA BB B
y dedp
y dedp
π π
π π
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
where the second-order derivatives are: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2
2
A A A A A A A A
AA A y AA A yy
A A A A A A A A A
AB B y AB A B yy
B B B B B B B B
BB B y BB B yy
B B B B B B B B B
BA A y BA B A yy
y p c e y y c
y p c e y y y c
y p c e y y c
y p c e y y y c
π
π
π
π
= + − − −
= + − − −
= + − − −
= + − − −
 (4) 
The second-order conditions for profit maximisation imply that 0AAAπ <  and 0BBBπ <  
while the usual assumption in Bertrand duopoly models is that 0AABπ >  and 0BBAπ >  so that 
the prices of the two firms are strategic complements. The own-price effects on (marginal) 
profits are assumed to dominate the cross-price effects so A AAA ABπ π>  and B BBB BAπ π> , and 
this implies that the determinant of the matrix in (3) is positive: 0A B A BAA BB AB BAπ π π π∆ = − > . 
Solving (3) yields the comparative static results for the effects of the export taxes on the 
prices set by the two firms: 
 
0
0
A A B B A B
A BB A BA
A A
B B A A B A
B AA B AB
B B
p y p y
e e
p y p y
e e
π π
π π
∂ ∂= > = − >∂ ∆ ∂ ∆
∂ ∂= > = − >∂ ∆ ∂ ∆
 (5) 
An export tax increases the price set by both firms. The comparative static results for 
the effects of the export tax on the exports of the two firms are: 
 
0
0
A A B A
A A A B A BA
A B A BB B BAA A A
B A B B
B B B A B AB
A B B AA A ABB B B
y p p yy y y y
e e e
y p p yy y y y
e e e
π π
π π
∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤= + = − <⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∆
∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤= + = − <⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∆
 (6) 
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The expression in square brackets is positive for firm A since it is assumed that 
A A
A By y>  and B BBB BAπ π> , and analogous assumptions hold for firm B. Therefore, an export 
tax will reduce the exports of the country that imposes the export tax. 
The welfare of each country is given by the sum of its firm’s profits and its export tax 
revenue: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
,
A A B A A A A A A A
B A B B B B B B B B
W e e e y p y c y
W e e e y p y c y
π
π
= + = −
= + = −  (7) 
In the Nash-equilibrium in export taxes each country maximises its welfare given the 
export tax set by the other country. The first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium in 
export taxes are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
A A B
A A A A A A A
y A y BA A A
B B A
B B B B B B B
y B y AB B B
W p pp c y y p c y
e e e
W p pp c y y p c y
e e e
∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= − + + − =⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= − + + − =⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂
 (8) 
Substituting the first-order conditions for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (2) into (8) 
and using the comparative static results from (5) and (6) yields the Nash-equilibrium export 
taxes: 
 ( ) ( )0 0
A A B B B A
A BB BA A AB
N NA A B A B B B A B A
A A BB B BA B B AA A AB
y y y ye e
y y y y y y
π π
π π π π
− −= > = >− −  (9) 
From (6) the denominator is negative while the numerator is negative since the 
products are assumed to be substitutes ( 0ABy >  and 0BAy > ) and prices are strategic 
complements ( 0BBAπ >  and 0AABπ > ). Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium export taxes are 
positive for both countries. 
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To compare the welfare of country A in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes, 
( ),A A BN NW e e , with welfare under free trade, ( )0,0BW , note that the difference in welfare can 
be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0,0 , 0, 0, 0,0A A B B A A B A B A B AN N N N N NW e e W W e e W e W e W⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (10) 
Since, in a Nash equilibrium, the government maximises its welfare given the export 
tax of the other country, ( ) ( ), 0,A A B A BN N NW e e W e> , so the first expression in square brackets 
must be positive. The second expression in square brackets can be written as follows using 
the mean value theorem: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0,0, 0,0 A BA B A BN NBW eW e W ee
∂− = ∂  (11) 
where 0,B BNe e⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Differentiating the welfare of country A with respect to the export tax of country B, 
and noting that the welfare of country A is equal to the profits of firm A when the export tax 
of country A is zero, yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0,A B A A BA A A A A A Ay A y BB B B BW e p pp c y y p c ye e e eπ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= = − + + −⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (12) 
Note that the first-order condition for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for firm A 
implies that the expression in square brackets is zero when the export tax of country A is zero. 
Hence, (12) becomes: 
 
( ) ( )0, 0A B BA A Ay BB BW e pp c ye e
∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂  (13) 
This is unambiguously positive so (11) is also positive and therefore both the 
expressions in square brackets in (10) are positive so the welfare of country A in the Nash 
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equilibrium in export taxes is greater than welfare under free trade. Exactly the same 
argument can be used for country B. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition: Welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than 
welfare under free trade for both countries under Bertrand duopoly. 
Both countries are better off in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes than under free 
trade even if there are cost or demand asymmetries. The result has been derived for general 
demand and cost functions. Of course, consumers in the third-country export market are 
worse off and their losses exceed the gains of the exporting countries. 
 
3. Conclusion 
It has been shown that both exporting countries are better off in the Nash equilibrium 
in export taxes than under free trade. This is the case whatever the demand and cost 
asymmetries and whatever the functional forms for cost and demand functions. This contrasts 
with the results in other trade policy games where one country may be better off and one 
country may be worse off in the Nash equilibrium in trade policies. 
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